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but a strategic act to serve authoritarian consolidation. Utilising a four-fold framework, the analysis illustrates 
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‘Constitutive localisation’, the process by which externally diffused policy norms are re-
interpreted and re-constituted through local practices and beliefs, has emerged in recent years 
as an explanation for the limits of norm diffusion.1 Importantly, such accounts have shifted 
the debate away from a universal and linear understanding of norm diffusion to one centred 
on norm contestation and the role of local agency in shaping normative orders. In this 
literature, the contestation of norms by local actors is framed as an emancipatory act that 
allows scholars to better understand local voices, which in themselves challenge the global 
liberal order. This article contributes to the literature on norm contestation by analysing how 
norms diffused by the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) 
2 
 
pertaining to elections and democracy are locally constituted and contested by domestic 
actors in Kazakhstan.  
 
The OSCE through its Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODHIR) has 
been committed to promoting democracy and human rights in Kazakhstan since the collapse 
2of the USSR and it has done this largely through election observation, among other 
activities. Despite the OSCE/ODHIR observing numerous elections in Kazakhstan since 
1994, the political system has, according to Freedom House and Polity data scores, become 
less rather than more democratic.2 Kazakhstan has developed a form of post-Soviet 
authoritarianism centred on the personalistic leadership of its first and only president, 
Nursultan Nazarbayev. Despite regular elections, a formal division of powers and ostensibly 
the rule of law, parliament is subservient to the president, political opposition is restricted, the 
judiciary is acquiescent to the executive, civil society is weak and problems persist with 
regards to human rights violations. The political system corresponds to a form of 
neopatrimonialism whereby Nazarbayev arbitrates the political and economic interests of 
competing informal elite networks.3  This illustrates the limits of the OSCE’s capacity to 
shape the normative behaviour of Kazakhstani authorities relating to the principle of fair 
elections.  
 
This article argues that limitations for norm diffusion in this case are rooted in the micro-
politics4 of norm contestation between the OSCE and Kazakhstani political elites and how 
they re-interpret and re-constitute OSCE/ODHIR norms through local discourse and practice. 
While the study builds on the work of existing norm contestation scholars, most notably 
Amitav Acharya, the argument departs from this literature in four ways: 1) by emphasising a 
more fundamental level of disagreement between the OSCE and local actors; 2) by 
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demonstrating that contestation can occur at a much later stage in the norm diffusion cycle;  
3) by focusing on the micro-politics of contestation by local actors involved in the 
implementation and interpretation of diffused norms and; 4) by illustrating norm contestation 
is not just a process of emancipatory politics, but can also be strategic and instrumental act by 
the recipient to serve the interest of authoritarian reproduction. 
 
Using the principles of election observation and the practice of free and fair voting as 
examples of norm diffusion, the article introduces a four-stage analytical framework to 
conceptualise the micro-politics of norm contestation between the OSCE and Kazakhstan. 
Firstly, norms are diffused by the OSCE and then secondly accepted by the Kazakhstani 
government and enshrined in law. In the third stage norms are reconstituted through political 
discourse (the norm of election observation) and/or political practice (free and fair voting) to 
meet the perceived particularities of the local context. This creates the final stage - the 
moment of contestation - where a disconnection between the diffused norm and its practice 
emerges.  
 
To provide an account of the micro-politics of norm contestation in Kazakhstan the study 
adopts an interpretive and qualitative research method using in-depth semi-structured 
interviews with local officials and representatives involved in Kazakhstan’s electoral process, 
along-side an analysis of OSCE/ODHIR reports, Kazakh legislation and media reports.5 The 
article is divided into three sections. The first offers a theoretical discussion on norm 
contestation and the limitations of norm diffusion. The second lays out the four-stage 
analytical framework for studying the micro-politics of norm contestation. The third section 
analyses external election observation and free and fair voting as illustrations of OSCE 
diffused norms and applies the four-stage framework to these two examples.  
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Understanding norm contestation and the limits of norm diffusion 
Norms6 in the international context are inherently prescriptive as they are defined by a set of 
standards where behaviour can be judged as ‘appropriate’ or ‘proper’. Such normative 
standards are agreed by a wider social community and divergence from the norm ‘generates 
disapproval or stigma, while norm conforming behaviour...produces praise’.7 The diffusion 
of norms is best defined as ‘the transfer or transmission of objects, processes, ideas and 
information from one population or region to another’.8 Norm diffusion has become an 
important function of major international organisations in recent decades.9 Conventional 
explanations for why norm diffusion fails can be broadly posited within two perspectives. 
There are those who adopt a rationalist approach which suggests external norm diffusion fails 
if organisations omit to establish substantial incentives for norm conformity or costs for norm 
deviation.10  Alternatively, others argue a favourable domestic context, politically and 
culturally, is essential for successful norm socialisation.11 In these two approaches the 
contestation of norms appears in the early stages of the norm diffusion life cycle where a 
discussion takes place in which the norm entrepreneur seeks compliance from the norm 
recipient to a normative framework whom in turn may seek to resist or re-interpret the 
normative order.12 As Deitelhoff and Zimmermann note, this literature makes the assumption 
that once the norm is established the element of conflict vanishes and local actors internalise 
norms in a rather uncomplicated manner.13  
 
The process of contestation does not terminate with adoption of a norm.  Norm diffusion is a 
dynamic process whereby norms are neither universally adopted or understood14 and through 
discursive and social practice the internalisation of norms remains a contested process.15 
Limitations to norm diffusion, therefore, can arise in situations where the meanings given to 
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norms by domestic actors conflict with the intentions of the external normative agent. This 
has been most acutely observed in the ‘constitutive localisation’ research,16 especially the 
work of Amitav Acharya17 which goes beyond the one-way linear model of norm diffusion. 
In his development of his idea of ‘constitutive localisation’, Acharya explains how local 
actors re-interpret and build congruence between global norms and local beliefs and 
practices.18 Acharya developed these ideas through an analysis of a two-stage localisation 
process in relation to Asian regionalism (in the 1950s and 1990s),19 but the assumption of 
norms entrepreneurs that norms are universal and can be consumed ‘whole’ by norm takers 
remains prevalent in the contemporary global context.20 
 
‘Constitutive localisation’ has the advantage of illustrating how diffused norms do not arrive 
in a local vacuum, that local norms matter and that norm diffusion is a dynamic process 
which amplifies local norms on the global stage.21 Norm diffusion, therefore, is a bottom up 
process marked by contestation, feedback and ‘norm subsidiarity’, a process by which local 
actors seeks to establish new rules with the aim of preserving their autonomy.22  
 
This ‘local turn’ in understanding the process of norm diffusion has been followed up by 
other scholars in different areas of IR. Aside from Acharya’s work, Wolff and Zimmerman 
highlight three other perspectives on norm diffusion which emphasise norm contestation.23 
This includes, the so-called ‘local-turn’ in peace and conflict studies which stresses the need 
for local ownership and local consultation in peace-building efforts;24 a critical turn in 
democracy promotion studies which suggests democracy promoters failure to recognise 
alternative conceptions of democracy and the emancipatory limitations of liberal democracy25 
partially explains the ‘backlash’ against democracy promotion;26 and work which has focused 
on the contestation of norms via discourse and practice.27 In highlighting this literature on 
6 
 
norm contestation, Wolff and Zimmermann bring to our attention how recent scholarship has 
sought to challenge universalist and totalising efforts of international actors from the Global 
North in the practice of norm diffusion. What they demonstrate is how local actors can use 
the process of norm contestation, whether as a form of agency28or discursive meaning,29 as 
an emancipatory act against the neoliberal order.  
 
This study seeks to contribute to our understanding of the contestation of norms in several 
ways. In line with Acharya, and to some extent the work of Weiner,30 this work argues that in 
the case of Kazakhstan and the OSCE norm regression occurs because of the reconstitution 
and reinterpretation of norms at the local level. However, this work departs from the 
‘localisation’ literature on four fronts. Firstly, the extent of disagreement over norms in the 
Kazakhstani case is more fundamental than simply making ‘the outside norm congruent to a 
pre-existing local normative order’.31 The disjuncture which occurs in the Kazakhstani case is 
not simply a re-interpretation of diffused norms regarding elections and democracy on the 
basis of pre-existing set of local norms, but instead diffused norms are intstrumentalised by 
local elites through discursive practice as a means of constituting a domestic normative 
framework (the Kazakh path to democracy) which aids the consolidation of authoritarianism. 
Local elites possess agency to re-interpret such norms for their own instrumental purposes, 
but it is not as if OSCE norms of elections and democracy are being diffused into a normative 
vacuum. As we will see below, the Kazakh government has had limited agency to shape the 
OSCE normative framework at the global level (the premise of the OSCE’s ‘human 
dimension’ was set by antecedent organisations long before Kazakhstan was an independent 
sovereign state), but it does have agency to re-interpret the diffused norms in the context of 
domestic political authority, but in doing so it fundamentally challenges the essence of the 
diffused norm.  
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Secondly, much of the norm contestation literature centres on higher-level politics – on how 
norms are reconstituted and re-interpreted at the level of regional politics32 or within the 
broader international arena at the European or Global level,33 or in relation to UN agendas 
such as R2P,34 UN peace-building models35 or the EU model of democracy promotion.36 
While they seek to introduce local voice and agency, there is a lack of emphasis on what I 
term the ‘micro-politics’ of norm contestation. Differently put, there has been a lack of focus 
on how the actual process of contestation plays out with those actors who are often involved 
in implementing diffused norms. For the diffusion of norms concerning democracy and 
elections, this would involve seeking to understand the meaning and re-interpretation of 
norms by actors in the electoral process and how they understand these norms in the context 
of the localised normative framework.  
 
Thirdly, a focus on the micro-politics of norm contestation, as this study argues, reveals how 
norm contestation can take place at a much later stage of the norm diffusion cycle when the 
reconstituted local variant of a norm encounters the original version in the practice of local 
political actors. This is in contradistinction to much of the literature which focuses on how 
norm contestation occurs at an earlier stage in higher-level debates regarding the setting up of 
regional normative orders such as in the case of Asian regionalism.37 In other words, a focus 
on micro-politics necessitates explaining how norm contestation works in practice at the local 
level.  
 
The final front on which this study departs from existing literature is to challenge the way 
norm contestation is assumed as a positive process which emancipates the Global South from 
the global liberal order. This literature is perceived to ‘depict contestation as a means to 
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achieve better dialogue and a more legitimate global order’.38 Nevertheless, not all 
contestation is imbued with emancipatory zeal. Norm contestation does not always lead to a 
genuine voice for local actors or to their emancipation from dominant global liberal norms. 
While Hobson and Kurki have been right to critique the failure of the democracy promotion 
community to develop a more sophisticated understanding of the multiple conceptualisations 
of democracy, and the need to take account of localised conceptions of democracy,39 how 
liberal democracy can be contested by norm recipient states is equally problematic. The 
contestation of liberal norms can be adopted by authoritarian regimes to legitimate their rule 
by using discourse and practice to strengthen their political position. By focusing on both the 
micro-politics of norm contestation, and not observing the process as one of natural 
emancipation, we can understand better why some norms fall from the international order.40 
 
Framework for analysing the contestation of norms 
This article puts forward a four-stage framework for understanding the micro-politics of norm 
contestation in the case of the OSCE and Kazakhstan. While the framework could be used in 
other cases, it is set up to the peculiarities of the OSCE and Kazakhstani case. Firstly, a norm 
is diffused by an external agent. However, in many cases of norm construction (and 
contestation), as the ‘constitutive localisation’ literature demonstrates,41 the norm taker can 
play some role in the construction of norms at higher-level dialogues. In the case of the 
OSCE and Kazakhstan the country has had limited agency to contribute to norm construction 
especially in relation to the human dimension of the OSCE agenda.42 Secondly, the recipient 
country will initially accept the norm and enshrine it in legislation. The third stage concerns 
the extent to which the norm is then either re-constituted through a public discourse which 
views the norm as incommensurable with local conditions or through political practice 
altering the norm to suit local behaviour. This reflects contestation as a form of ‘constitutive 
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localisation’43 and discursive practice.44 In the final stage this creates a disconnect, in other 
words, the moment of contestation, between the theory of the norm (the initial promotion of 
the norm in stage one and the acceptance of the norm in stage two) and the practice of the 
norm (channelled through the discourse or practice of a perceived cultural specificity for the 
application of the norm).  
 
As a consequence of the four-stage process, the external agent perceives the practice of the 
norm as a failure of compliance while recipient authorities feel frustrated by the criticism, as 
in their view they have met the legal terms of the norm but practiced in a specific way related 
to the cultural conditions on the ground. This leads to disagreement with regards to whether 
only meeting the specific form of a norm constitutes the spirit of the norm in practice. 
Differently put, a state such as Kazakhstan might claim to be ‘democratic’ on the grounds 
they possess a constitution with a division of powers and a commitment to procedural 
electoral democracy, and do so with a locally inflected interpretation of democracy (the 
Kazakh Way), but in practice the substance of democracy – the fairness of open competition 
free from the arbitrary influence of the state and regime is absent. In practice, the contestation 
of norms in this way leads not to a form of liberation from the Global North, but rather as we 
can observe below it helps consolidate an authoritarian regime. 
 
Table 1. to go here 
 
The remainder of this article will utilise this framework (table 1.) to study the micro politics 
of norm contestation in relation to two norms diffused by OSCE/ODHIR:  the principles of 
election monitoring and free and fair voting procedures. 
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The Micro-politics of Norm Contestation: the OSCE and Kazakhstan 
 
Stages 1 and 2 Diffusion and acceptance of the norm of election monitoring 
The OSCE consists of 56 members from across Europe, the former Soviet Union and North 
America. OSCE participating states are committed a series of principles associated with 
democratic governance related to elections and democracy set out in paragraphs 6-8 of the 
1990 Copenhagen Document.  Specifically, the document commits participating states to the 
notion that the presence of international election observers will enhance the integrity of 
election processes and that they should invite observers from any OSCE participating states 
and other appropriate organisations to observe elections.45 
 
As signatories to the Copenhagen Document, the government of Kazakhstan is committed to 
external observation of their electoral process. As one member of Kazakhstan’s Central 
Election Committee (CEC) noted, Kazakhstan is one of the few countries which commits to 
international monitoring by law,46 as it is enshrined in Article 20 of the 1995 Law on 
Elections.47 The Kazakh government has always permitted the presence of OSCE/ODHIR 
election observers during the run-up to and over election periods. Since 1994 the 
OSCE/ODHIR has observed 7 parliamentary elections (1994, 1995, 1999, 2004, 2007, 2012 
and 2016) and 4 presidential elections (1999, 2005, 2011 and 2015) in Kazakhstan. None 
have been considered to have met the standards and principles set out in the Copenhagen 
Document by OSCE/ODHIR Election Observation Missions (EOMs).48 
 
Stage 3: reconstitution of election monitoring via discourse  
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Despite accepting the principal of election observation, a discourse has emerged in 
Kazakhstan which reconstitutes the commitment to external election monitoring. The 
discourse is in two parts. The first critiques the extent to which OSCE/ODHIR election 
observation norms amount to an imposition of Western norms on an alien political culture. 
For instance, after the OSCE/ODHIR critiqued the 2012 parliamentary election, Nazarbayev 
commented that ‘the varying mentalities, histories and traditions of different peoples are not 
being taken into consideration...Western culture, which is propagandized by the United 
States, cannot simply be transplanted’.49 The conditions of democratisation in Kazakhstan are 
believed to be qualitatively different from the Western experience which emerged as a natural 
part of the development of civil society.50 This is framed within public discourse as 
Kazakhstan possessing its own unique Kazakh path to democracy.51  
 
This perceived incommensurability between the particularities of the local context with 
OSCE/ODHIR norms is then transposed into the second part of the discourse which centres 
on the selectivity of election observers in terms of the application of norms in specific 
country cases. For instance, Nazarbayev has often expressed dissatisfaction with the fact that 
the OSCE is only interested in the human dimension of the OSCE’s activities (i.e. protecting 
human rights, elections etc.) rather than issues of material security such as fighting terrorism 
and the drug trade.52  This feeds down to a discourse which claims the OSCE/ODHIR 
practices double standards and is selective in how election observers apply its perception of 
whether the country meets certain standards. There is a tendency to understand the OSCE as 
being too flexible in cases where other countries have similar electoral practices to 
Kazakhstan. For example, Belarus is evoked as a country in which OSCE/ODHIR final 
election reports were less critical than those of Kazakhstan’s, despite both countries suffering 
similar problems such as electoral fraud, executive interference and an inequitable media 
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environment for opposition candidates.53 This is then characterised as a form of double 
standards on the part of the OSCE/ODHIR EOMs.54 Ex-Foreign Minister Marat Tazhin 
argued that ‘the OSCE should avoid double standards and adjust its structure; only to ensure 
uniformity in the interpretation of international standards will it achieve confidence... It is 
important to get rid of accusations regarding the organization of its selectivity and double 
standards’.55 A further example is how one election official noted how ‘Poland, the country 
which hosts the headquarters of the OSCE, does not even allow international election 
observers into polling stations’, but in Kazakhstan they were expected to.56 
 
Stage 4: the moment of contestation 
The consequence of this perceived incommensurability and double standards is that 
OSCE/ODHIR election observation is challenged, the expertise of OSCE/ODHIR observers 
is questioned and EOMs undermined. It creates the moment of contestation. For example, one 
local election official stressed that observers, ‘could not distinguish Pakistan from 
Kazakhstan…have little knowledge of the country…and behave disrespectfully’.57 The issue 
of discourteous behaviour was also raised by a member of Kazakhstan’s Central Election 
Commission (CEC) who noted that at specific polling precincts election observers had not 
mentioned any irregularities to the chairman of the polling stations and only listed problems 
with the voting process after the fact.58 The validity of recommendations made by EOMs is 
also brought into question as they are accused of only being ‘interested in scandal or 
provocations’.59 Furthermore, it is considered EOMs should be ‘more benevolent and have a 
more humanistic attitude’ to Kazakhstan’s electoral process.60  
 
This questioning of the election observation process serves to contest the principle of election 
observation so that ultimately in the eyes of participants, ‘observers have lost their 
13 
 
necessity… and are not needed anymore’.61 Indeed, the president has even gone as far to 
suggest that Kazakhstan could refuse OSCE/ODHIR EOMs in future.62 The principle of 
international election observation of Kazakhstan’s electoral process has moved from 
acceptance to being refracted through a discourse which situates the norm in dissonance with 
cultural conditions and then to outright contestation. This is a level of disagreement beyond 
the seeking to make norms congruent with local conditions. The discourse of the ‘Kazakh 
Path to Democracy’ in fact marks a fundamental challenge to the OSCE/ODHIR normative 
framework pertaining to elections.  
 
Stages 1 and 2: Diffusion and acceptance of the norm of Free and Fair Voting Procedures: 
election commissions 
The Copenhagen Document also commits signatories to holding ‘free elections that will be 
held at reasonable intervals by secret ballot or by equivalent free voting procedure, under 
conditions which ensure in practice the free expression of the opinion of the electors in the 
choice of their representatives’.63 The commitment to conditions which ensure a free and fair 
voting process is contested via the localised practice of a systematic institutional bias in 
favour of Nazarbayev and his political party Nur Otan (Light of Fatherland). This is 
achieved, principally, by the staffing of election commissions with loyal members of Nur 
Otan. The product of this political culture is systematic electoral fraud and the consolidation 
of the Nazarbayev regime.  
 
The term ‘under conditions’ implies the necessity of an administrative set up which ensures 
free elections and free expression can take place. The administration of elections in 
Kazakhstan are organised by election commissions which exist at four levels: National 
(CEC), 16 Territorial (Oblast Level), 208 District (Raion level) and 9840 Precinct (polling 
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district level). Election commissions are responsible for the organisation of elections, voter 
lists and vote counting at each level. The establishment of election commissions are 
understood as meeting a central requirement of the OSCE64 and are considered vital by both 
Kazakhstani politicians and the OSCE to certifying the electoral process is fair and 
transparent.65 Furthermore, guaranteeing a balanced composition on election commissions in 
which ‘members of opposition parties are represented is an important way of ensuring the 
counting of votes is fair as it should be’.66 
 
Stage 3: reconstitution of the norm of free and fair voting 
The norm of free and fair voting, through balanced election commissions, has undergone 
significant ‘constitutive localisation’. This is a process whereby rules pertaining to the 
election of commissions are changed in response to requests from the OSCE, but then further 
adapted to meet perceived local conditions which are underpinned by loyalty and patronage. 
For instance, prior to 1999, regional, presidentially-appointed, Akims (governors) were 
responsible for appointing the commissions.  Loyal patrons, reliant on local executives for 
their livelihood, such as teachers or doctors, were usually selected on the basis that they 
represented a reliable source of patronage. However, in response to the criticisms from the 
OSCE regarding the impartiality of election commissions the rules were changed in 1999 so 
political parties would be guaranteed at least one seat on all commissions through the process 
of drawing lots. The rules were altered again in 2002 so all territorial, district and precinct 
election commissions were elected by the corresponding Maslikhats (local councils) based on 
proposals from political parties.67 Despite outwardly seeming to grant political parties greater 
control over the electoral process, election commissions remained staffed with members from 
pro-presidential parties, most notably Nur Otan. The OSCE/ODHIR final reports for the 
2004,68 2007,69 2012,70 and 201671 parliamentary elections all note serious concerns 
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regarding the independence and plurality of election commissions. Nur Otan dominates all 
levels of election commissions,72 out of 10000 election commission members; the opposition 
Nationwide Social Democratic Party (OSDP) party put their membership at an estimated 
5%.73  
 
The imbalance of the composition of election commissions, despite an explicit norm 
guaranteeing all parties the right to appoint at least one member onto every commission with 
the right of a deliberative vote,74 is largely a consequence of the norm being reconstituted 
through the practice of the executive being able to control and regulate election 
commissions.75 Principally, executive control is maintained via practice rooted in loyalty and 
patronage which acts as an embedded institutional bias within the electoral system favouring 
the president and Nur Otan. This results in a collusion between local executives and election 
commissions. For example, most precinct level election commissions are in local authority 
buildings, typically schools.76 As a rule, the heads of schools or institutes are appointed to the 
position of chairman of election commissions by the local Akimat (local governor’s office) 
and ratified via the corresponding Maslikhat.77 Heads of schools are usually then charged 
with appointing teachers who work in their schools to the election commission, and according 
to one account ‘are told which party they represent’.78 Public sector workers, such as 
teachers, owe their position to the head of the school, who in turn owe their position to the 
local Akim. The local Akim owes their position to the district Akim above them and so on. 
Each agent in this configuration undertake activities based on loyalty, and therefore, in 
relation to election commissions, ‘will strictly follow the instructions which are given from 
above. And the instructions are to promote the interests of Nur Otan and those of associated 
parties.’79  
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Maslikhats (which ratify and vote on the composition of election commissions suggested by 
political parties), the local Akimat and other public associations are also often filled with 
those who work for state institutions. Therefore, ‘to gain a seat in the Maslikhat, people need 
to ensure their employees vote for Nur Otan; otherwise they will be denied a place in the 
Maslikhat.’80 The significance of this is that positions (and to some extent resources – both 
political and economic – attached to these positions) are dependent upon loyalty to the 
patron. It is the patron who provides the client with their position and client loyalty is 
demonstrated by following instructions and failure to comply with instructions from above 
can lead to the loss of a position and resources. As one opposition politician put it: 
 
‘polling stations are usually located in state schools and the head of the school is 
subordinated to the local Akim.  The chairman (of the election commission) is the head of the 
school and the members of the commission are teachers. If a teacher starts telling the truth 
about the election and the voting process they will lose their job.’81 
 
What we see above is that the norm of a commitment to a free and fair voting is reconstituted 
in the practice of the election commission selection whereby political behaviour driven by 
patronage and loyalty undermines the principle of fairly-balanced election commissions. This 
creates a systematic institutional bias towards the president’s party Nur Otan and affiliate 
pro-regime political parties.82  
 
Stage 4: Moment of Contestation 
Consequently, this institutional bias produces varying forms of electoral engineering which 
manufactures the vote in favour of Nur Otan or the president and which represents the 
moment of contestation for Kazakhstan’s commitment to free and fair voting practices. One 
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such example is the so-called Karusel (carousel), a form of election engineering well-
practiced across the former Soviet space in which groups of people are bused around different 
polling stations and vote several times using the same absentee ballot.83 In the case of 
Kazakhstan, one opposition member noted how, ‘heads of governmental institutions order 
their employees to vote for Nur Otan. It is an established practice that teachers will vote up to 
10 times during the election…when these illegal voters arrive at the polling station they give 
a password and receive the ballot. It’s organised like a Karusel’. 84 At the precinct level, with 
polling stations near, the bussing around of groups of state employees in this way to vote 
multiple times is easy to organise. A further challenge to a free and fair voting process is the 
practice of ballot stuffing which is when an individual is left freely to place multiple ballots 
into a ballot box. Clearly, such a practice could be stopped by the election commission given 
that only one ballot paper should be distributed to individuals who also must present their 
identification card. Reports and even video evidence of ballot stuffing has become common 
place during election-day. The most recent 2016 parliamentary elections saw various reports 
surface in Almaty and other cities where individuals were recorded stuffing ballot boxes.85 
 
The practice of falsifying elections is systematic and its roots lay in the executive control of 
election commissions. In the aftermath of the 2011 presidential elections, documents were 
leaked which seem to show how the administrative command system worked. The documents 
detailed how the Department of Health were ordered to arrange for a 100 percent turnout for 
employees and how at the Kazakh National Technical University in Almaty students were to 
be organised from 7 in the morning for orderly voting.86 It was also noted how teachers 
would be punished if they did not guarantee 100 percent turnout.87 Election commission 
oversight of the voting counting process is also understood to be poorly conducted. 
OSCE/ODHIR reports are littered with examples from election observers with regards to 
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instances where ballot papers were placed in the incorrect pile (typically they were added to 
the pile for the president or Nur Otan) or other types of violations of vote counting 
procedures such as obscuring the counting process from observers, the presence of Nur Otan 
representatives and other unauthorised personnel such as the police and local authority 
officials at the vote count and the failure to cross check voting tabulations.88 The former 
leader of the Auyl (village) party, Gani Kaliev also alluded to these issues claiming the 
‘process was hidden’ and that his party’s representatives ‘were not allowed to observe the 
vote counting process’.89 
 
The dominance of pro-regime representatives at all levels of elections commissions ensures 
the norm of free and fair voting is severely contested in practice. While there is acceptance of 
the norm, its translation in practice is undone by executive control. The Karusel, ballot 
stuffing, absentee voting and pressure on state employees to produce 100 percent turnout for 
their institutions leads to incredible official voter turnout in some cases close to 100 percent. 
Again, this is not simply the congruence of international norms to local practice, but rather 
the loyalty and patronage which underpins the electoral process in Kazakhstan represents an 
indisputable challenge to OSCE/ODHIR norms pertaining to elections and democracy. The 
overarching implication of the undermining of the principle of free and fair voting in 
Kazakhstan is not the contestation of an international norm seemingly celebrating the Global 
South breaking from the shackles of a Western-imposed normative order, but instead the 
steady consolidation of an authoritarian regime. The manipulation of election commissions 
by local executives undermines the practice of multi-party composition on such commissions. 
Dominated by pro-presidential members, election commissions at every level of the electoral 
process from individual polling stations up to the CEC, carry out forms of political behaviour 
which significantly skew the vote in favour of the president or Nur Otan. Over the last ten 
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years at least this has led to the further centralisation of power in Nazarbayev as an individual 
and his overall grip of the political system.90 The discourse and practice of the these locally 
constituted norms pertaining to elections and democracy have only further embedded the 
power of Nazarbayev through thumping election victories which did not meet international 
standards and were subject to electoral engineering. 
 
Concluding discussion 
A focus on micro-politics in the case of Kazakhstan and the OSCE brings much needed 
attention to how local actors, not just governments, receive and re-constitute norms diffused 
by external agents.91 It also revealed how contestation can occur at a much later stage in the 
norm diffusion cycle, with a much more fundamental level of disagreement beyond a lack of 
congruence, and that contestation at the micro-level is not necessarily a form of emancipation 
from the Global North, but instead can aid the consolidation of an authoritarian regime. This 
study has detailed how contestation occurs because agents within the electoral process 
undermine formal acceptance of a norm in a strategic effort to ensure their interests are met. 
Local actors interpret norms to ensure they are congruent with an existing discourse or 
practice to safeguard their political position, but this interpretation fundamentally challenges 
and undermines the norm being difused. This process consists of local actors firstly parroting 
a discourse emanating from above regarding the Kazakh path of democracy which is viewed 
as incommensurable with OSCE/ODHIR norms and secondly, guaranteeing their position by 
demonstrating loyalty to the president by ensuring election commissions are staffed with 
loyal lieutenants whereby electoral fraud takes place unsanctioned.  
 
The extent to which, however, both the discourse of the Kazakh path of democracy, and the 
practice of election management, represent an alternative normative framework and a 
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demonstration of agency remains unclear. Focusing on the latter stage of the norm 
contestation cycle, however, can help clarify. The Kazakhstani government’s agency in 
relation to setting the normative agenda for democracy and elections within the OSCE is 
stymied by not just being a less well-established actor, but also by the fact that when the 
Copenhagen Document was written the country was not officially an independent state. It had 
to accept the terms of the document with little agency to influence those terms. Kazakhstani 
political actors can mostly only influence OSCE/ODHIR norms to any great effect after their 
diffusion, acceptance and legislation. Thus, the demonstration of local Kazakhstani agency 
and norm contestation pertaining to elections and democracy occurs much later in the norm 
diffusion cycle. While this contestation is instrumentalised by political elites for their own 
advantage, it also remains an important aspect of their agency within a normative order in 
which they have had previous little control over.  
 
This focus on the micro-politics and later-stage of the norm diffusion cycle also represents an 
opportunity to consider the issue of norm regression. OSCE/ODHIR EOMs in Kazakhstan 
demonstrate the limitations of the post-Cold War liberal normative order. The localisation of 
norms pertaining to elections and democracy clearly challenges global efforts to the spread of 
the liberal democratic model. The reasons for norm regression in this instance is not simply 
rooted in the failure of the OSCE to solicit sanctions for non-compliance of norms.92 Instead 
the locally constituted discourse and practice of OSCE diffused norms in Kazakhstan which 
has aided regime consolidation exists within an emerging normative regional framework put 
forward by norm entrepreneurs such as Russia and China through the Shanghai Organisation 
Cooperation (SCO). Within this framework stability and sovereignty are preferred over 
liberal democracy and human rights93 and it provides an environment in which contestation at 
the later stage of the norm diffusion cycle develops a form of internal legitimacy against 
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liberal democratic norms. Thus, the micro-politics of norm contestation is an integral part of 
norm regression in this case – allowing local actors to instrumentalise and practice a broader 
set of emerging regional norms - set against the universal and totalising efforts of liberal 
democratic norms. Nevertheless, we should be careful of reading this as some form of 
emancipatory act – what it fundamentally results in, as we see in the case of elections in 
Kazakhstan, is the consolidation of an authoritarian regime. 
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